Abstract
Introduction
It is recognized that maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships constitute major threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly in the coastal states of Nigeria [1] . The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) notes Madsen [2] , defines piracy and armed robbery against ship as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act". The above definition involves actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is in port, at anchorage, or in the high sea. It was noted that the act of robbery at sea is the same in the process of the crime whether committed outside or inside the 12 nautical miles zone of a nations territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the internal waters, there exists important legal distinctions [2] . Robbery at sea committed inside these waters is considered armed robbery against ship while only attacks committed outside of the territorial waters and outside the jurisdiction of a coastal state, i.e. in the high sea is considered piracy.
It further defines piracy as any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act aimed at forcefully boarding a ship with apparent intent to commit illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depression, committed for purposes of private ends by the crew or passengers of a pirate boat or aircraft in the high seas. The above definitions hold distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly when considering the legal structure governing the crime itself and the institutions implicated in response to such crime in varied geographical locations. In this study, we use the word piracy to mean both types of acts (armed robbery and piracy). This is because, the IMB reports on which the study is based does not distinguish between the duo [2, 3, 4] .
In a study on Sea Piracy and Security Challenges of Maritime Business Operators in Bayelsa State Nigeria, the study notes that, the African seaways namely; the coast of the Horn of Africa (HOA) and the Gulf of Aden (GOA); in the East coast of Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG); in the West coast of Africa, from the year 2007 to date have become mine fields for sea pirates, witnessing intense attacks against ships [5] . This threatens maritime security in the zones affecting negatively global trade flows and economic growth in Africa. It is the opinion of Onuoha [4] that since 2007, African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; of global maritime piracy with much of the global attention in African waters being on Somali maritime piracy. The Somali pirate attacks, observes [6] accounts for more than half of the pirate attacks recorded annually in Africa. This is seconded by Gulf of Guinea (GOG) attacks. The Gulf of Guinea attacks are concentrated more on Nigeria and is rated globally the second most dangerous after Somali [4, 7] . They expressed concern that the GOG attacks might get more dangerous and may have far more negative effects on global economy and seaborne trade than the Somali attacks. This is because; the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) holds great economic potentials and importance in global energy supply from fossil fuel fields, they added. Onuoha [4] , on his own part, views that it would account for 25 percent of global offshore oil production by 2020 as compared to 22 percent from the Persian Gulf.
The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) region is the part of the Southern part of the Atlantic Ocean, South West of Africa, formally, referred to as the Gulf of Biafra [4] . The region encompasses above a dozen countries from West and Central African, namely; Angola, Benin, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Cote Dvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Togo [8] . Anene [8] observes that it is located more strictly by the intersection of latitudes 00 (equator) and longitude 00 (Greenwich Meridian). See Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Expended MAP of the Gulf of Guinea Region
The GOG is strategic in global energy supply from crude oil and natural gas resources. In 2010, more discoveries of large deposits of fossil fuel in the GOG were in Ghana's "Jubilee" field, situated some 60 km offshore and at Siera-leone's "Venus oil field" with both stocking above 200 million barrels each. New discoveries were as well made, off the Coast of Liberia, thus the region holds potential to make significant output of energy from fossil fuel to the global economy in the 21st century [4] . With 50.4 billion barrels of proven reserves, 5.4 million barrels of oil production per day, the GOG is a key hub of commercial exports of hydrocarbon and imports of manufactured goods, food items and heavy equipment. This huge economic potential of the region drives the fear that piracy in the area if not curtailed, may derail the growth of economy of the GOG countries, their global trade partners, and other parties with strategic interests in the potentials of the region [9, 4] .
Recent researches on the issues of piracy in the region notes that the majority of Gulf of Guinea piracy and insecurity challenges occurs in the Nigerian Maritime domain [10] . Nigeria thus, dominates maritime security issues in the GOG. [5] , supported by [7] , identified about nine coastal zones in the six coastal states of Lagos, Rivers, Bayelsa, Ondo, Akwa-Ibom, and Cross River in Nigeria where piracy attacks are frequent.
Industry observers opine that recent pirate attacks in the Nigerian maritime domain take place mostly within Lagos ports (berths) and Lagos anchorage, Bony River, Forcados River, Rivers State Coastal area, Bayelsa Coastal area, Akwa Ibom Coastal area, Crosss River coastal area, Delta State (Warri) Coastal area, and Ondo Coastal area with majority of the attacks concentrated in the coastal zones in the Niger Delta [3, 1] . The figure below gives the nature of the spread of sea piracy and armed robbery in the waters of Nigeria.
Figure 2: Nigerian Coastal Zones and Piracy Incidents
The united nation convention on trade and development [10] and the International Maritime Bureau [11] note that, 65 percent of pirate attacks in the Nigeria maritime domain of the Gulf of Guinea use guns and arms mainly to kidnap for ransom purpose and steal cargoes, cash and valuables. Piracy in Nigerian maritime domain over the years was fuelled by illegal oil trading and oil theft activities which was a much more organised crime with links to foreign citizens and organizations than piracy itself. With the implementation of the IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS code) in Nigeria, a decline in attacks particularly in the ports is expected particularly in Lagos ports and its attendant anchorages. [8, 11] . The ICC International Maritime Bureau foresaw limitations in information gathering on maritime piracy, and for statistical purposes, gave a joint definition of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The IMB defined the concept of piracy and armed robbery against ship as an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent or capability to use force in furtherance of the act [8] . Since the data collected for this research is based on IMB reports, this shall be the working definition of piracy in this discuss.
Review of

Theoretical Framework 2.2.1. The Routine Activity Theory
Essien and Adongio [5] note that the basic perspective for analyzing the substantive issues of piracy is anchored on the routine activity theory (RAT). The routine activity theory (RAT) is an offshoot of the socio-structural theory advanced by Colhen and Felson. Igbo [12] , as reviewed in Essien and Adongio [5] note that the routine activity theory explains crime as a product of the combined result of three associated elements namely: 1) Potential offenders or persons who are motivated to commit crimes, 2) Suitable targets; that is the presence of things that are of economic value and which can be easily transported, 3) Absence of capable guards or persons who can prevent a crime from taking place. [5] Note that the proposition put forward by RAT explains the factors that prompted the occurrence of pirate attack in Nigerian maritime domain and the attendant threat to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Principally, the preponderance of suitable targets (fishing travellers, oil tankers, commercial non oil carriers, oil installations of multi-national oil companies, foreign expatriates for kidnap, etc.) according to routine activity theory is a motivator, that has sustained the occurrence of pirate attacks. Another problem is too weak maritime security apparatus and the near unavailability and inadequacy of competent security personnel/network to safeguard the maritime domain. There also exists a large army of unemployed and underemployed youth seeking for satisfactory means of economic fulfillment. These factors have over the years fully activated and sustained pirate attacks in Nigeria maritime domain and the gulf of Guinea [5] .
The routine activity theory (RAT) concerns itself with explicating the individual motivational factor in crime causation which other traditional sociological theories of crime do not. Its main preoccupation is to emphasize on how ordinary or normal lawful conventional, routine activities of individuals increase the probability of criminal activity [12] .
The Weakness of the Failed States Theory
Monteclos [1] notes that undoubtedly, linking politics to crime is important to understand the causes and purposes of maritime violence. The Failed State Theory (FST) advanced by Weber defines a failed state as a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly. Likewise, when a state weakens, and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of government collapse which means that, the state has been rendered ineffective and is no longer able to enforce its laws uniformly or provide basic goods and services to its citizens because of high crime rates, extreme political corruption, an impenetrable and ineffective bureaucracy, judicial ineffectiveness and military interference in politics, among others. Thus, a failed state is characterised as having the following; 1) Loss of control of its territory or of the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force therein, 2) Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, 3) Inability to provide public services and, 4) Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.
Monteclos [1] insists that weakened or failed states facilitate piracy which reduces the authority of the state. The relationship he adds, between piracy and state control is quite complex. In African setting, particularly in Nigeria, the failed state theory is obvious in explaining the preponderance of pirate attacks in the maritime domain. The weakness of the Nigerian state and the backlash is observed to be a structural colonial legacy and the State got weaker during the Biafran War period (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) ; and in the recent past when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), made demands for resource control of the Niger Delta resources, resulting in militant groups to springing up in the area to demand for rather their inheritable portion of the "national cake" without contesting the authority of the State. Moreover, the role of the Nigerian Government towards piracy in Nigerian waters is quite ambiguous as opines [13] , that some government officials collude with the pirates and militant groups to really undermine the authority of the State with impunity. Security forces (police, Navy, Army) do not only attack the militants; they also participate in illegal oil trading, piracy and kidnappings which is the core under-current factor ravaging the Nigerian economy as obvious corruption in our faces today. The corrupt governors of the oil-producing states as well use these gangsters to get rid of opponents, fund their illicit activities, yet, also fund the dominant political parties [1] . Monteclos [1] alleged that "the Nigerian State itself is involved in maritime piracy as analysis of government agencies says a lot in this regard, the army, to start with, often concludes shady deals with the militants to share the booty and negotiate a status quo". The Nigerian Navy too is corrupt and involved in illegal drug and oil trading activities. The weakness of state theory explains why today insiders in the Navy, Army, Customs, and Port Authorities still inform pirates and militants in the locations where boats are and the real values of their cargo, which over the years has been the bane of winning the war against maritime piracy in Nigeria and GOG at the end. Onuoha [14] in their study of the piracy trend in the GOG are of the opinion that the State was established to serve as an instrument for the domination and exploitation of resources by the colonial powers in Europe. As a result, the postcolonial African state has not been able to refit that warped design which has led to the state's incapacity or unwillingness to accomplish even the most basic sovereign duties including establishing security, order and social cohesion.
Empirical Review
It was believed that the Nigerian state was designed from purely utilitarian point to suit the economic and political interest of the colonial masters. Thus the country seems from independence any real ability to exercise sovereign rights over her maritime domain. As a result, the State is lacking the ability to maximize resources, provide clear vision for maritime governance and is almost holistically constrained in capacity to provide maritime security [14] . As a result, negligence by the Nigerian state account for above 50 percent for piracy in the GOG maritime domain [14] .
Lack of Legal Framework for Maritime Security Management
Monteclos [1] is of the view that, the weak, inadequate and corrupt legal system in Nigeria is a component contributor to piracy and armed robbery incidence in Nigerian maritime domain. According to the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) reports as reviewed in Monteclos [1] , very few or no pirates are prosecuted every year. Onuoha [14] , observes that, ineffective implementation available laws on piracy and maritime security crimes have been a problem over the years. This has correlation to multiple other factors among which include capacity shortage and corruption in government, which gives criminals little or no official disruption to their activities [14] .
Another challenge in maritime security legal framework in Nigeria and GOG States is the inability to properly implement treaties relating to international maritime security.
The Militancy Problem in the Niger Delta
Onuoha [4] supported by Akpobolekemi [15] , in a study on security challenges in the Nigerian maritime domain, [5] 
Cost of Piracy in Nigeria Maritime
Domain
Stefan [16] opines that the cost of piracy in the Nigerian maritime domain comes in various forms; ranging from cost of military operations, cost of security equipment and guards, cost of labour and hazard pay accruing to seafarers in high risk areas (HRA), cost of piracy related insurance, cost of prosecution and imprisonment, cost/ value of stolen cargo, to cost of counter piracy organization and maritime security capacity building efforts. The total yearly cost of piracy in the Nigerian maritime domain and GOG is estimated to be about 1billion dollars [16] .
Objectives
The aim of the study is to analyse the incidence of sea piracy and maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea focusing on the Nigerian maritime domain. The specific objectives include:
• To establish the level of significance in variation in the piracy and armed robbery attacks in the maritime domain of the GOG countries.
• To examine the nature of variation in piracy and armed robbery attacks in the entire GOG in the review period.
• To estimate the trend of piracy and armed robbery attacks on ships in the Gulf of Guinea from 2002 to 2014. • To determine the level variation in ship attack incidents among the coastal zones of Nigeria.
• To ascertain the significance of variation in yearly reported piracy and armed robbery attacks in the entire Nigerian maritime domain.
Hypotheses
H 01 : There is no significant variation in the piracy and armed robbery attacks in the maritime domain of the GOG countries.
H 02 : There is no significant variation in yearly piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG in the review period. H 3 : There exists an increasing trend in ship attack incidents in the GOG in the review period.
H 04 : There is no significant variation in ship attack incidents among the coastal zones of Nigeria.
H 05 : There is no significant variation in yearly reported pirate attacks in the entire Nigeria maritime domain.
Methodology
The research adopted an analytical approach in which the researcher obtained a time series data of 15 years running from 2002 to 2015 from ICC International Maritime Bureau on piracy and armed robbery attacks in 15 GOG countries including Nigeria. The symbols X 1 X 2 … X n , where n = 15, were used to represent each of the countries involved as shown on Table 1 below.
Besides piracy and armed robbery attacks in the coastal zones of the Nigeria maritime domain, collected from IMB sources, were analyzed. The data also covered a 14-year period from 2002 to 2015. The coastal areas where the attacks occurred in Nigeria are denoted by C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , ---C n , where n = 9 were used to represent each piracy prone coastal zone in Nigeria.
Trend analysis was also carried out using the ordinary least square (OLS) method regression in which the time of attacks 'x' in years was used as the independent variable and the number of attacks 'Y' in the GOG each year within the period of study used as the dependent variable. Trend analysis determines the nature of the attacks over time, since the attacks are dependent on time to occur. It determines whether attacks increase or decrease overtime. Using the ordinary least square method of regression, the model can be represented as: Y = a 1 -b 1 x + e Where Y = piracy attacks, a 1 = intercept, b 1 = coefficient, e = error term. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical model was used to measure the level of variation and the significance of variations in reported piracy and armed robbery attacks among the GOG countries and among the coastal zones of Nigeria. The ANOVA model uses the F-statistics to test the significance of the null hypotheses.
The sets of data collected were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The hypotheses were tested using F-test.
Limitation of the Study
The data collected for the study is based on the international maritime bureau publication on reported sea piracy and armed robbery cases within the review period. As a result, the accuracy of the findings depends, to a large extent, on the accuracy of the data used for the research since not all sea piracy and armed robbery cases in the study area may have been reported within the review period. 
Data Presentation
ANGOLA= x 1 - 3 - - 4 1 2 - - I - - 1 - Benin Republic =x 2 - 1 - - - - - 9 - 20 2 - - - Cameroun= x 3 5 2 4 2 1 - 2 3 5 - 1 - 1 - Congo DR = x 4 - - - - 4 3 4 1 2 3 2 - 1 2 Equqtorial Guinea = x 5 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - Ghana =
Results and Findings
The result on table 4 showed that the highest attacks in the GOG occurred in Nigeria waters, followed by Ghana and Guinea. A total of 324 attacks occurred in Nigeria in the last 14 years, with Ghana and Guinea having reported cases of 40 attacks each over the same period. This translates to averages of 21.6 attacks in Nigeria, 2.67 attacks in Ghana and Guinea per annum. Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin republic, and Angola had reported attacks of 35, 32, and 30 respectively in the last 14 years Equatorial had only one reported attack over the past 14 years giving her an average of 0.06 attacks per annum over the period. The sum of all GOG piracy and armed robbery attacks against ships over the last 14 years is 608, and about 53% of these attacks occurred in the waters of Nigeria. This is in agreement with the results of the study by Ukeje and Nmvomo [3] who found that the GOG attacks ranks second in Africa after the Somali pirates and is concentrated more in Nigerian waters. The findings of Onuoha [4] that Nigeria accounts for 55% of GOG attacks also supports the present research findings.
The rate of reported annual attacks in the GOG in the period under review showed neither consistent increment nor decline Table 1) .
Test of hypothesis H 1 by f-test showed an f-ratio of 33.45 and f-critical of 1.746. Since 33.45>1.746, (f-ratio is greater than f-critical), we reject hypothesis H 1 and accept the alternate that there is a significant variation in the reported piracy and armed robbery attacks in the maritime domain of the GOG countries in the past 14 years.
Test of hypothesis H 2 showed an F-ratio of 0.88, and F-critical of 1.77. Since 0.88<1.77 (F-ratio is less F-critical), we accept the null hypothesis H 2 that there is no significant variation in the yearly piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG in the review period.
The result of the trend analysis of table 1 using a linear regression showed that, the quantitative model showing the trend of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG is Y = 51.62 -0.96x + e. The multiple R is 0.301. This reflects the existence of about 30.1% degrees of association between time of attack in years and number of attacks within the period. The R square is 0.091, indicating that; only about 9.1% of variation in number of attacks is explained by the independent variable. The gradient of the function is -0.96. This shows that there is a decreasing trend in maritime piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG maritime domain within the period. Thus, we reject null hypothesis H 3 to accept the alternate that there is a decreasing trend in maritime piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG within the period covered in the study. This decreasing trend is the result of the amnesty programme of the Nigerian government from the year 2009 which engaged the militants believed to be involved in piracy into meaningful skills and educational training opportunities and jobs which in the view of the RAT is a potent approach to curbing piracy and armed robbery at sea.
The result of the analysis on Table 5 shows that more piracy and armed robbery attacks took place in Lagos ports and anchorages than any other coastal region of Nigeria with a total of 204 attacks over the past 14 years. This translates to an average of 15.6 attacks in Lagos ports and anchorages per annum over the period. This is followed by attacks in Rivers state coastal zone and Bonny River each of 138 and 128 attacks which translate to 10.6 and 9.5 pirate attacks respectively in Rivers state coastal zone and Bonny River per annum. The other zones of Bayelsa coastal zone, Akwa Ibom coastal zone, and Delta coastal zones ranked third, fourth, and fifth with a total of 86, 54, and 31 attacks respectively. Cross River coastal/Calabar River, Forcados River and Ondo coastal had a total reported attacks of 17, 12, and 3 respectively. The result shows that Ondo coastal had the least number of reported attacks with an annual average of 0.23 attacks. Lagos ranks highest in the reported attacks on ships over the past 14 years. Emphasis on counter piracy measures has been more in the Niger Delta coastal zones than in Lagos ports and anchorages. This is probably due to the fact that the reported attacks on ships in the Niger Delta coastal zones, when put together is higher than that of Lagos, and partly due to the prevalence of oil fields in the Niger Delta. This is contrary to the findings of Onuoha [4] and Ukeje and Mvomo [3] whose studies found that piracy in Nigeria centre most in the states of the South-South (Niger Delta). It however supports the work of Monteclos [1] who notes that a great number of under-reported attacks against ships occur in Lagos ports and anchorages. However, the studies of Monteclos [1] , Ukeje and Mvomo [3] and Onuoha [4] did not use any scientific method or model to test the level of significance in the variation in pirate attacks among the coastal zones of Nigeria and GOG states as done in this work. The predominance of sea piracy and armed robbery in Lagos more than any other coastal state in Nigeria suggests that militancy may not in actual be the major causative agent of sea piracy is Nigerian waters. The present trend witnesses the focus of less combative strategies in Lagos waters than in other states and this portends danger, suggesting further the complicity of government officials in the Ports and waterways, which is an opinion alleged seriously by Monteclos [1] . Following the non existence of militancy problem and resource control agitation in Lagos, there is need for further inquiry into the casual factors of piracy in Lagos ports and anchorages.
The incidence of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the coastal zones of Nigeria showed neither consistent annual increases nor consistent decline, from preceding year values, in the last 14 The test of hypothesis H 5 showed an F-ratio of 5.06, and F-critical of 1.85. Since 5.065 is greater than 1.85 (f-ratio > f-critical), we reject null hypothesis H 5 and conclude that there is a significant variation in the yearly piracy and armed robbery attacks in Nigerian maritime domain in the review period.
Conclusion
The evidence from the analysis and findings proved that 53% of all GOG attacks occurred in Nigeria. This shows the existence of variation in sea piracy and armed robbery attacks in the GOG maritime domain with Nigeria contributing most. The trend is however seen to be decreasing according to the findings. Thus to curb the menace of sea piracy in the GOG greater combative effort and strategy must focus on Nigerian waters. Also, 30.3% of pirate attacks on ships in Nigeria take place in Lagos ports and anchorages. In line to the objectives of the research, there exist variation in sea armed robbery attacks in Nigerian maritime domain (coastal zones) with Lagos contributing most. Majority of sea piracy and armed robbery attacks in Nigeria occurs in Lagos, yet the fight against sea piracy and armed robbery in Nigeria is limited in Lagos or non -existent at all but concentrated only in the oil bearing coastal states.
Recommendations
The majority of authors reviewed in this work are in support that piracy and insecurity in Nigerian maritime domain is a highly organized crime in which top public government officials are involved, thus supporting the argument of the weakness of failed state theory, the routine activity theory and the three capability gap theory.
It is therefore, recommended that for long term solution to the challenges of security and maritime piracy in Nigeria and the GOG, the principles of the routine activity theory, the weakness of failed state theory and the three capability gap thesis must be examined and be applied.
1. Government and private sector stakeholders must identify potential offenders, Particularly the high risk areas of the Nigeria starting with Lagos ports and anchorages, Rivers state coastal zone, Bonny River, Bayelsa coastal, Akwa-Ibom coastal and delta state coastal zones, CrossRiver coastal, Forcados River and Ondon coastal zones, in order of decreasing rates of attack and provide them with means of full employment to discourage them from piracy and armed robbery and other related crimes.
2. The weakness of failed state theory identified incapacity to provide security, corruption and judicial ineffectiveness as key characteristics of a failed state which encourages piracy and armed robbery. It is recommended that Nigeria must build and upgrade her naval capacity to provide security in the water ways, included in this is capacity to curb corruption among the Navy, Judiciary and port workers Particularly in the high risk areas of the Nigeria starting with Lagos ports and anchorages, Rivers state coastal zone, Bonny River, Bayelsa coastal, Akwa-Ibom coastal and delta state coastal zones, CrossRiver coastal, Forcados River and Ondon coastal zones, in order of decreasing rates of attacks to limit their involvement in planning pirate attacks in Nigeria, while funding and implantation of key maritime security instruments to which the country signed in each of the major piracy prone coastal zones is recommended. This will help the present inter-regional alliances between the navies of the GOG countries to yield better fruit.
3. Closure of all legitimacy gaps. Based on the capability gap thesis which identified legitimacy gap as one of the key factors fueling piracy; the Niger Delta militancy problem and resource control struggle can best be explained by the legitimacy gap. By the nature of Nigeria, there exists multiplicity of ethnic groups recognised in the Constitution necessitating the doctrine of Federal character system which legitimately provided for groups from all over the country to be properly and adequately represented in all strata of Government, in manner and to the extent provided by the Constitution of the Federation. Where these legitimate rights are scuttled by the majority of the ethnic groups against the minority, the results are obviously disastrous as has been witnessed over the years in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and GOG. All legitimacy gaps must thus be closed for long term solution to piracy in the Nigerian maritime domain. Since the Niger Delta coastal zones (states) in total account for about 65% of all pirate attacks over the period and government concentration of military power to combat piracy in the region is motivated by its contribution to government revenue to oil export operations, it is very important that the authorities must give attention to closing all legitimacy gaps that motivate fuel militancy.
Suggestion for Further Research
It is suggested that a further research be carried on the causal factors of piracy and armed robbery in Lagos ports and anchorages and the cost implications in the maritime industry. This is very important since Lagos is not known to be an endemic zone for militancy and oil theft activities which are known to be drivers of sea piracy in the Niger Delta coastal states.
